PASOK: The Peculiar Greek Social Democracy

The Greek social democrats have been on a recovery path since 2012 when the biggest crisis of their history began. After the successful formation in 1974, the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) experienced a spectacular rise and for four decades it decisively influenced the prevailing Greek politics. For a long time, PASOK had the broad support of the majority of socioeconomic groups and along with the conservative New Democracy (ND) defined Greece's path to the democratization and Europeanization era. The multidimensional crisis which Greece had entered after the onset of the international economic crisis in 2007 had a drastic impact on the political landscape. In the dual parliamentary elections on May 6 and June 17, 2012, PASOK received 12-13% of the votes, only three years after it had received 44%. In 2015, PASOK received the worst electoral percentage in its history, namely, 4.6%. This decisive defeat was expected for a long time, but no one predicted its dramatic size. In any case, PASOK has clearly lost its earlier influence and entered a long period of resignation and disorientation. This study focuses on the specificities of PASOK in comparison with the social democratic parties of Western Europe.

Introduction
Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), a Greek version of social democracy, has followed a synchronized path and is characterized by a great deal of special features in contradiction with the social democratic parties of the advanced countries of the Western Europe. In this sense, PASOK expresses, on the one hand, the delayed emergence of social democracy in Greece. On the other hand, PASOK was the decisive political power which enhanced the gradual social normalization, social integration, convergence, democratization, Europeanization and modernization of the Greek society, and therefore it constitutes an endemic element of its modernity. PASOK's advanced modernism, in other words, allows us to assume that not only will it survive and recover from the current crisis, but will return to new times of hegemony. However, some theorists conjecture that the PASOK era is over and that the once-proud party has plunged into insignificance while it is unable to find the right tools to recover and prevent its own extinction.

As Lyrintzis¹ notes ''there are clear signs of fatigue of the political forces that dominated the Greek political scene for 35 years. Their practices, decisions and omissions have been registered in the collective social memory.... The most probable result will be the end of the era of the autonomous one party governments and possibly a realignment of the political forces''.

Especially after the parliamentary elections of 2015, some scholars such as Martel² underline that ''the combined indignity of losing the elections to not one, but three other leftist groups-SYRIZA, The River, and the Greek Communist Party-as well as losing to Golden Dawn may have been the last nail in the coffin for Pasok. The party's death knell had been ringing for years in the height of the debt crisis that Papandreou failed to solve. In an article in 2013, Greek supporters of the party told the BBC that uttering ''Pasok'' is ''like a dirty word.''---- the far left has won, so the Greek people are moving left. But the Greek people have also abandoned the dominant centrist leftist party of the past century, preferring to bank on the wildly unpredictable SYRIZA/Golden Dawn upstarts''.

In the same line, Karakousis³ insisted that ''PASOK as we know it has ended. It cannot be saved by heirs, fresh-faced young leaders or party members who think that they are leading the reform, but in reality are living in a fantasy land''.

The representation crisis in which PASOK has entered is so impressive that the crisis of social democracy in general (in the European level) is presented and interpreted by the term ''Pasokification''. Christides⁴ notes in Spiegel that PASOK's fall ''was so impressive that it became synonymous with the crisis of the center-left parties on a pan-European level''. There is even discussion of ''halting'' when, in a European country, social democratic parties are in danger of disappearing from the political map. Everywhere in Europe, socialist and social democratic parties encounter serious problems, because the left and right boundaries are becoming more and more inconspicuous, but also because the so-called revolting or protesting populist parties collect even more votes. In the case of PASOK, the collapse accelerated in 2010 due to the financial crisis. Therefore, Dorian defines the term Pasokification as a complete disorganization of a traditional social democratic party under the pressure of a dynamic and radical alternative, while Ferguson emphasizes that Pasokification poses a real risk to all established and dominant social democratic parties because if they fail to express an effective opposition to austerity and to the social crisis, their electoral base is beginning to see them as inappropriate and unworthy.⁵

Doran⁶ also notes that ''the parliamentary leadership of Pasok---- has effectively split from the majority of its activists and voters. What was a mass party has now become a minor player ....The result of the ''Pasokification'' of traditional social democratic parties across Europe is the growth of more radical electoral forces such as SYRIZA in Greece, which both contest and occupy the terrain of social

democracy-defending the remaining gains of the postwar period of unprecedented social peace whilst asserting opposition to the class war agenda of the capitalist class. Whereas the traditional social democratic parties have come to distance themselves from their funding and organizational base in the trades unions and other social movements, the newer radical parties embrace extra-parliamentary activity and seek to give voice to concerns arising from below''.

From another point of view Chakrabortty⁷ stated that PASOK ''has spent decades under the influence of Tina: the idea that ''there is no alternative'', either in how to run an economy or how to run a social democratic party. The rise of SYRIZA shows that the rule can be broken. And for all its labelling as a far-left party, much of SYRIZA's platform is simply left-wing social democracy, as the politicians believe in it, rather than as just another dead slogan. Over the past few years, SYRIZA's thinkers have sometimes quoted a text as a kind of description of their window of opportunity. It is from Antonio Gramsci's Prison Notebooks. In it, the Italian communist notes: ''At a certain point in their historical lives, social classes become detached from their traditional parties ... The particular men who constitute, represent, and lead them, are no longer recognized by their class (or fraction of a class) as its expression. That applies to Greece''.

Based on the above-mentioned considerations, we will try to counter the argument that the economic crisis actually constituted the end of the traditional parties in Greece and, in particular, of social democracy. As a first step, it is important to identify the specificities of PASOK that differentiate it from Europe's social democratic regimes in order to identify some of the root causes for its current decline.

The Peculiarities of the Greek Social Democracy: The PASOK Case

First Peculiarity: The Creation of PASOK in a Political System Which Was Based on Cliental Relations and Patronage
At the beginning of the analysis, it is important to emphasize that PASOK's ascendant course is closely linked to the whole outline of the Greek party system. The ''cradle of democracy'', namely, Greece, is essentially a youthful democracy with a very new party landscape. Apart from the communists, all other parties were founded after the military dictatorship. This is, among other elements, only one of the strong deviations from western standards.⁸ This specificity also applies to other Mediterranean countries, such as Portugal and Spain. The main features of the party system are the relation of parties with patronage networks and the powerful influence of charismatic leaders.

After the end of the military dictatorship and the monarchy, a party system with three fixed blocks and a dominant bipartization was formed.⁹ In addition to the social democratic PASOK, the conservative New Democracy (ND) and the Communist Party (KKE) were the other two blocks. Since their inception, Blue (ND) and Green (PASOK) have largely dominated Greek politics and shaped the two main governance and power poles from 1974 and the re-establishment of democracy until 2012, in the framework of an ideologically tripartite party system.¹⁰

The Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which was banned during the military dictatorship and was legitimized only in 1974, has for long represented the main force of the divided left/socialist space. The political culture and society of modern Greece is characterized by cliental relations of ''fatherhood and nepotism'', in combination with ''charismatic political personalities''.¹¹ In this political landscape, the younger Greek democracy proved to be weak.¹² In order to ensure the operational efficiency of the system through unilateral majority, the electoral system of ''enhanced proportional representation'' was introduced in 1974. Based on this electoral system, the electoral winner received 50 extra parliamentary seats regardless of its electoral outcome. The outcome of the 2012 elections that emerged through the multidimensional crisis has put the established Greek political system in question.

Given its strong and traditional clientelism, which linked accessibility to the state and to the administration with relations of political dependence on politicians, officials and MPs, PASOK, rather than its person-centered orientation towards the powerful leader-founder Andreas Papandreou, overturned the structured formation of the political and social system in 1981 when it won the elections for the first time, towards the direction of a newly established institutional Europeanization and democratization.

With PASOK, for the first time in modern Greek political history, a bourgeois party with an organizational structure, with an organized basis of members, with specific democratic procedures, with an elementary ideological expression (socialist orientation, pursuing a decentralized structure of the state, several reforms and a welfare state), with an operational, regional and local level network of organizations spread across Greece (about 2,000 local organizations) and with an efficient central party mechanism¹³ has been created. In order to be successful, PASOK had to create new and unique structures, develop grassroots organizations and networks that would reach up to the smallest places and recruit members. These structures have always been the primary factor for every inclusive party. It is worth noting that PASOK had, in its establishment in 1974, between 3,000 and 4,000 members. At the end of 1982, PASOK had already 150,000 members.¹⁴

Second Peculiarity: Political Instability
The development of a stable party system in post-war Greece began only in 1951. The civil war (1946-49) had divided the country immediately after the end of the German occupation, causing prolonged instability and political upheaval. Since the Communist Party had been banned since 1947, both the right and the center have constituted fragmented governments that were unstable. Under these circumstances, amorphous and unstable political formations emerged, some of which appeared as a gathering of old leaders and ideas of the past, and others under the leadership of infinite neophytes of politics, none of whom were able to present a solid mass party.¹⁵ The situation changed in 1951 when two new parties appeared, representing the united right and the united left. In this way, the Greek party system entered the stage of structural stability, although the center remained fragmented for another decade. Within the changing conditions of the post-dictatorship era with the rapid social and political changes that were accompanied, the emergence of the medium socioeconomic groups seeking an active political expression of their aspirations, PASOK succeeded to win the power with the slogan of change expressing the ongoing changes as well as the hope that it would embrace emerging social needs. With the slogan of ''change'', PASOK also expressed the democratic ethics and hence the need to democratize the country, the elimination of authoritarian practices and the institutionalization on the basis of democratic rituals and procedures. Issues such as the predictability of institutions, the consistency and continuity of the state, meritocracy, accessibility to the welfare state and accessibility to institutions, social and educational equality and fairness, were firstly connected with the concept of change but only during the 1980s, when PASOK emerged.

The rise and establishment of PASOK under Andreas Papandreou has been decisive for the democratic stabilization of Greece. This is true for at least two reasons. On the one hand, PASOK's growing organizational empowerment and networking significantly facilitated the ever-increasing accumulation of votes, resulting in conceptualizing the party as a ''counterweight'' to the status quo of the right. On the other hand, PASOK's victory, seven years after its establishment, had been a clear indication that democratic processes in Greece can be stabilized and that alternations in power are feasible. Therefore, PASOK broke the monopoly of power held by the Greek right for 60 consecutive years and established a party switching to power within a bipolar party system.

PASOK's clear position for a democracy with a social pillar and a vertical fight against the authoritarian practices, has helped the enhancement of the democratic consciousness in Greece, regardless of the radical rhetoric that the party had adopted. The radicalization of PASOK at this stage was perhaps necessary in order to obtain the alternate profile and be delimited against the right ND and the KKE. In this sense, PASOK's stabilizing factor worked both by incorporating the masses into democratic processes and by spreading the radical libertarian discourse. PASOK had a certain ideological discontinuity between the revolutionary leftist rhetoric and political orientation towards power. In order to bridge this gap, Andreas Papandreou used masterfully a peculiar populism but abandoned it when the question of the fall of the existing socialism and the full integration of Greece into the European construction emerged. Despite any internal contradictions, PASOK managed to present itself as the party of change.¹⁶ In addition, PASOK expressed the increase of social mobility, intense politicization, national intolerance and hope for social welfare.

Third Peculiarity: Asynchrony
Greece's delayed political stabilization and late establishment of modern democratic institutions are important parameters that explain the asynchronous development of social democracy in Greece. In 1863, when Germany's Social Democratic Party was created, Greece was sunk in a civil war after King Otto's eviction. The revolutionary forces were trapped by the ''national question'' when in the developed Europe the First Socialist International in 1864 in London separated the communists from the anarchists and the Second in 1875 marked the road of the creation of the European social democracy. In the post-war era in which the golden age of social democracy began in Europe through democratic capitalism, Greece still struggled for its political stabilization.

''The democratic capitalism was fully established only after the Second World War and then only in the 'Western' parts of the world, North America and Western Europe''¹⁷----(as a) political-economic peace formula between capital and labor that had ended domestic strife after the devastations of the Second World War. Essentially that formula entailed the organized working classes accepting capitalist markets and property rights in exchange for political democracy, which enabled them to achieve social security and a steadily rising standard of living. More than two decades of uninterrupted growth resulted in deeply rooted popular perceptions of continuous economic progress as a right of democratic citizenship-perceptions that translated into political expectations, which governments felt constrained to honor but were less and less able to, as growth began to slow''.¹⁸ ''The structure of the post-war settlement between labor and capital......included an expanding welfare state, the right of workers to free collective bargaining and a political guarantee of full employment, underwritten by governments making extensive use of the Keynesian economic toolkit. When growth began to falter in the late 1960s, however, this combination became difficult to maintain. While free collective bargaining enabled workers through their unions to act on what had become firmly ingrained expectations of regular yearly wage increases, governments' commitment to full employment, together with a growing welfare state, protected unions from potential employment losses caused by wage settlements in excess of productivity growth''.¹⁹

At the time when a historic compromise between capital and labor, inherent in widespread political consensus, was being developed in Western Europe under the political hegemony of social democracy, a process of healing from civilian wars was under way in Greece. In the 1950s, the country was in a difficult condition after the participation in the world war and the civil war. The economy was totally destroyed, growth rates and industrial development were actually non-existent. Greece in the 1950s was a destroyed country waiting for politicians to reorganize it. The main problem for the delay in the development of socialist parties in Greece was that there were fewer workers to support a ''proletarian revolution'' or a ''proletarian reform''.

In Greece, social democracy appeared as an independent and powerful political player only after 1974, with a considerable delay, due to the level of development of Greek capitalism and mainly due to the problematic social and political history of the country. Certainly, there was a significant development of capitalism in Greece since the late 1950s and of course this development has had an impact and positive consequences on the social structure of the country and on the stratification of the working class. Greece evolved into a modern country with class mobility, ideological confusion and political liquidity. Economic growth was not accompanied with the diffusion of spiritual narratives that would raise the social issue. However, social democracy can only exist in a developed country so that it can support a welfare state that requires wealth, industry, bourgeoisie as well as workers.

However, PASOK found a way to implement the social democratic political agenda in Greece through its specialized adaptation to a context of interpretation of the peculiar Greek political framework. This agenda had been elaborated by the founder Andreas Papandreou who correctly interpreted that the Greek society was in transition from economic underdevelopment to the path of development, with all the associated psychosocial and political dimensions (aspirations of rising mobility, democratization, etc.). Carefully Papandreou explained not only the causes of the discomfort and sociopolitical exclusion of widespread socioeconomic groups from the political and economic structures, but also formed a ''redemptive'' proposal for a way out of the socioeconomic and institutional deficiencies. Papandreou introduced a whole repertoire of concepts derived from modern theories of democracy. He introduced the notion of a grid of economic and political power which, along with the economic oligarchy, engages in a conspiracy against democracy by establishing a parallel power, an obscure and dark partisan that acts in the background with proper secrecy against the people.²⁰ Papandreou clearly described the role of progressive leadership towards the established and reactive elites. Thus, he insisted that ''we need to rectify an injustice at cost of the politicians-the person whose profession puts him at the center or organized pressures''.²¹ Putting stringent standards for leadership, Papandreou noted that ''the supreme responsibility of the politician was to rise above the partial interests, to synthesize a functionally viable concept of the national interest and to work for its realization within the labyrinth of pressures he receives to deviate from his line''.²² As Nikos Papandreou notes, Andreas Papandreou ''believed in a Greece that belonged neither to the Warsaw Pact nor to NATO, a country that would follow its own ''third'' path. His political base consisted mainly of the ''small-scale entrepreneur,'' the ''underprivileged,'' the farmer and the student, all those who had little to no access to power.''²³ Papandreou insisted that it is necessary ''to organize a grass roots movement, a movement capable of reacting to any efforts to overturn a democratically-elected government. Unique in the constitutions of the world, after 1981, he will amend the constitution to allow soldiers to refuse order if such orders violate democracy''.²⁴

At the same time, Papandreou stressed the need for a massive modernization of the country, for the participation in the common market as a positive challenge, the democratic modernization of the parties, the abolition of customer relations as well as the modernization of educational institutions. The democratic acquis described by Papandreou was of course included in a national liberation rhetoric. In the end, Andreas Papandreou's overall narrative was transcendental to Greek innocence and gave the country prestige, status, social cohesion and a democratic entity.

''The stories that politicians offer pertain to their political positions. Sometimes they persuade, sometimes they fail to wake even a mouse. Successful leaders are those who not only shape events, but also shape the interpretation of those events. Such leaders leave their stamp on the society. Politicians who are leaders do not accept the given narrative. They propose a new one, one that-if they themselves are a truly great public figure-make them part of the commonly shared and accepted history. To a large degree, Andreas Papandreou convinced people of the need for change, an analysis which differed from that of the Left, Center, or Right. And that is why he finally earned massive support from the Left, Center, and Right. People of differing backgrounds and ideologies felt part of a large progressive patriotic movement, one that wished to change Greece....Calling someone a ''patriot'' before Andreas appropriated and reshaped that word, meant you belonged to the right. The communists were considered traitors and the right claimed to be the ''true'' patriots of the country. The new boy on the block, Andreas, claimed you could be a patriot without being a rightist-nationalist. He appropriated that term and made it possible for all Greeks to call themselves ''patriots'' without automatically implying that they belonged to a certain political party. In this way he took the wind out of the right-wing sails. But he also proposed social policies that resembled those dreamed of by the partisans fighting the Germans. Thus, a large number of left-wingers came over to his side. Progressive social policies plus a ''Greece first'' foreign policy succeeded in uniting disparate people under one large political party''.²⁵

Fourth Peculiarity: PASOK's Advanced Modernism
After the end of the dictatorship, Greece faced a huge problem of institutional and economic hardship when compared with Western Europe. The dictatorship ended the ambitious reform efforts to upgrade the public administration and the state of the democratic government of Georgios Papandreou (1964-65). These reforms ranged from the greater emphasis on technical and administrative training, the reduction of unnecessary personnel and decentralization. With the assumption of power by the military, the reforms of Georgios Papandreou were completely demolished and denounced as communist inspired.²⁶ The right-wing government (1974-81) that followed the dictatorship attempted to introduce some reforms that were relatively shortlived. Far more ambitious were the efforts of the social democratic governments of Andreas Papandreou (1981-89) and Costas Simitis (1993-2006). ''The Papandreou government attempted to establish a transparent area of administration and services, both in terms of internal operations and recruitment, appointments, transfers and promotions''.²⁷ ''In addition, a unified salary scale grading and rating system, decentralization and other measures were proposed, aimed at reducing the bureaucracy and increase its responsiveness to public needs. The latter included simplification of procedures and establishment of a bureau of public grievances aimed at discouraging the shelving of responsibility and improving interagency communication and coordination. Finally, a School of Public Administration was established in 1985, based on the British and French models, to train high civil servants as well as prospective ones by offering ''practical knowledge'' in place of ''theoretical knowledge'' offered by existing university curricula''.²⁸

With the modernizing Simitis government since 1995, a new wave of administrative reforms followed, and under the pressure of the EU, the goal of modernizing the public administration was set as an absolute priority.

''The main thrust of Simitis' efforts aimed to improve the bureaucracy's capacity to respond ''to the needs of the public''. Toward this goal, the government adopted a two-track policy. One, to upgrade autonomy and responsibility so that ministries will no longer be in the business of merely ''issuing certificates, but drafting and implementing policy''. The prime minister tried to establish a ''one-stop shop'' allowing the citizen to deal with one single servant ''for a variety of administrative issues, such as applying for a pension, or getting a driver's license, rather than visiting of services to collect taxes''. The other would improve the technical and technological skills of civil servants so that they can respond to the needs of the citizenry. To help ensure performance, the government decided that ''civil servants must be evaluated. Finally, to assist citizens space for their grievances, Simitis set up an ombudsman's office ... The ombudsman's task was to ''help restore the balance between the individual and the state''.²⁹

Fifth Peculiarity: Conditions of a Political Culture Without Constitutional Patriotism
Instead of the notorious western European culture of trust, consensus and constitutional patriotism that determined its post-war development, in Greece there is a peculiar divisiveness which is a crucial obstacle to the country's development and modernization. It is worth to point out that Habermas adopted the concept of constitutional patriotism-by Sternberger, who developed it in 1979³⁰-which is a prerequisite for stability but in Greece it is still restrained. Sternberger understands constitutional patriotism as political pride³¹, which does not refer to national identity but to constitutional order. Habermas understands the concept of constitutional patriotism in a similar way and initially applied it at the national level. Given that current societies are characterized by an increase in pluralism, Habermas takes a ''fusion of majority culture into that universal political culture, which requires recognition by all citizens, regardless of their political and cultural heritage''.³² According to Habermas, there must be a decoupling of nationality, origin, religion, and subculture in general, with the dimension of the common political culture, so that there can be a common political belief in a framework of democratic constitutional state principles.³³ If this process of disconnection is successful then the national identity can be based on constitutional patriotism.³⁴

In Greece, after the Second World War, the dimension of political pride towards particular values of the democratic state has been insufficient. Thus, the common political belief in a framework of democratic constitutional state principles has ceased, as well as the universal recognition of a specific framework of principles of law. On the contrary, from 1950 to 1967 there was an internal national division and a crisis of institutions manifested by political instability. Personal aspirations and political considerations seem to be over and above any development of the country. It is a fact that the constitutional monarchy that emerged in Greece after the 1946-1949 civil war proved to be unstable. The country was governed by a ''secondary and side-by-side constitution'' of the partisan who essentially violated the parliamentary system.³⁵ King Constantine II did not limit himself to his supreme office in performing his legal duties, but increasingly interfered in the internal affairs of the army and politics. In other words, he wanted to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the government, regardless of the will of the people. In the 1964 parliamentary elections, the Association of the Center of Georgios Papandreou received the overwhelming majority, but in the same year the king forced him to resign.³⁶ In order to not to leave the field free to the undemocratic forces, the ''Papanastasiou Group'' and the ''Democratic Associations'' were established. Both organizations form part of the ideological roots of PASOK. The Papanastasiou Group was founded in 1964 by young Greek scientists who had studied in Europe, including the late Prime Minister Costas Simitis. These organizations dealt with the analysis of economic events in Greece and supported the left wing ''Union Center'' of the subsequent Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou. In 1965, the ''Democratic Associations'' were created by Andreas Papandreou's friends. The ''Revolution of July il 21, 1967'', as the coup of the Greek colonels was called, came as a surprise to the king and to the democratic groups.³⁷ A small group of middle level, anti-communist officers under Colonel George Papadopoulos took advantage of the unstable political situation to organize a coup d'etat on July il 21, 1967, and violently took power. For the next seven years a state of emergency prevailed imposed by the military dictatorship in Greece. Although the scheme managed to achieve some financial successes, it received little support from the wider population. The dictatorship remained politically isolated, without internal or external support.³⁸

After the end of the dictatorship, the gradual democratization of the country and the rise of PASOK to power were followed by the recognition of the National Resistance as a prerequisite for the final national reconciliation and political integration of all Greeks under a democratic constitution. These actions launched for the first time in Greece the constitutional patriotism in practice. Also, with the proclamation of September 3 Papandreou introduced a ''social contract with the people'' that was characterized by constitutional patriotism and mobilized Greek society to act collectively in support of democratic and social institutions. The same is true for PASOK's governmental program of 1981, which was titled ''contract with the people'' and was intended to mobilize citizens on the basis of their democratic wisdom in setting up a new socioeconomic and political structure on the basis of certain principles. By promoting national reconciliation, democratic institutions and social cohesion, PASOK had significantly promoted the constitutional patriotism of the Greeks in the sense of defending constitutional legitimacy, namely by defending democracy and the rule of law.³⁹

Sixth Peculiarity: Social Radicalism as a Precondition of Sociopolitical Cohesion
PASOK's supporters and representatives belonged to a variety of diverse categories, namely to institutions that expressed liberal, reformist, neo-Marxist and radical (leftist currents, Trotskyist) ideological-political perceptions. In its initial phase, the neo-Marxist concept prevailed in PASOK, on the basis of which the content of the struggle policy was defined around the question of metropolis-region and thus dependence-independence from international imperialism. This element was gradually weakened as Greece entered the integration trajectory in the European framework. In the first period, however, PASOK's neo-Marxist radicalism incorporated the radicalized Greek society. In this sense, PASOK's initial radicalism was a necessary element for the complete transformation of PASOK into a social democratic formation in the short term. In order to understand the previous argument, it should be noted that the process of shaping the Greek Social Democracy after 1970 was in a context of intense political radicalization as well as in the late rise of the labor movement.

At the same time, the issue of democratization and modernization of the Greek capitalist society immediately arose, which was very late in relation to the economic and social development that had already taken place. Despite the ''smooth'' transition from the dictatorship to parliamentary democracy, the traditional bourgeois parties of the right wing and the center, could not ensure the continuity of the modern processes, because there was the important question of the orientation of the radicalized sections of the society. In other words, there was a question of political hegemony in the popular movement that was inflating and entering into a political formation, and there were risks to the uninterrupted continuation of ''normality'' in the post-transition process. In this short, but politically decisive period (1974-1981), social democracy emerged in Greece with a radical ''left'' political program, with references to ''social liberation'', ''socialization of the financial system as a whole'' and of ''the basic production units'' in order to lay the foundations for ''stopping human exploitation''. At the same time, it called for NATO-exit and no entry into the EEC, denounced monopolies and international imperialism, while even international social democracy was characterized as the ''long hand of international imperialism''. Thus, with an anti-monopoly, democratic, socialist agenda (without, of course, embracing scientific socialism), it embodied a series of demands of the working class and the people with a bourgeois-democratic, antitrust, and ''socialist'' political background.

In just a few years, PASOK managed to absorb almost all the executives and the electoral influence of the ''centrist'' electoral area (which, of course, came from its own leader who was a member of the Union Center and a minister in the government that had formed in the pre-dictatorship era) and a significant part of the power previously expressed through the United Democratic Left (EDA), and of the layers moving between these two sites-Center Union and EDA. Under these conditions, Greek social democracy was imposed on the consciousness of a very large part of the radicalized popular masses as the main political force in the struggle for democracy, national independence, social liberation and socialist transformation of the Greek society. Therefore, PASOK summed up all these demands in the slogan of ''Change'', and succeeded in forming a government in 1981.

Seventh Peculiarity: The ''National Liberation Struggle'' as a Decisive Political Element
At the time of the military junta, various resistance organizations emerged, focusing mainly on non-violent protest. Among these resistance organizations was the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK), an exiled organization, consisting mainly of Greek socialists and social democrats. The organization's executives and activists had fled during the military junta-among others-to Germany to organize a democratic opposition against the dictatorship.⁴⁰ PAK was founded in the beginning of 1968 in Sweden by Andreas Papandreou.⁴¹

The principles of PAK, as announced by Papandreou on November 1, 1968 were ''to become the center of democratic resistance in Greece. Its task is to coordinate resistance in Greece and to overthrow the junta and establish genuine democratic processes that will guarantee a complete and unconditional popular sovereignty based on a permanent and stable basis. It therefore totally excludes any undemocratic solution and any kind of directed democracy of the establishment. It officially declares that it will work for a democratic, progressive and nationally free Greece and will not accept any compromise at any stage of the struggle. It will fight for a full democratic victory'' (Objectives and Organization of the PAK, www.agp.gr, 6/10/2002).

More specific goals were formulated in 1970 with a five-point statement of a program of unity of ''anti-dictatorial forces''. PAK clarified the demand to lead the resistance, something which had not met the general consensus. It cannot be considered from the beginning as an organization oriented towards socialism. PAK only in 1972 presented a specific political program aimed at ending the military dictatorship and liberating Greece. This was the first time that the political direction of the organization was clear: PAK aimed at a socialist, democratic and neutral Greece. However, Greek socialism should not be identified either with Western European social democracy or with the existing socialism of Eastern Europe.⁴²

The agenda of PAK clearly contained an anti-Western stance and promoted Greece's withdrawal from NATO. Due to the belief of an American support of the Greek military junta, anti-Americanism was part of the PAK program. Its resistance activities abroad were initially limited to Papandreou's lectures. Since 1971, a small group of resistance fighters had been trained, inter alia, by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Later, PASOK incorporated PAK's national liberation agenda into its founding program, making the issue of national independence and popular sovereignty a fundamental element of its policy.

However, at the time of PASOK's rule, Greece eventually did not leave the EEC and NATO. Papandreou estimated that an exit from the EEC would have a much higher cost for the country than the corresponding cost of the stay. Andreas Papandreou's orientation had been fictitious, but kept as far as possible his patriotic-ethnic features. As Thatcher noted, ''I did not like him, but he never left the EEC summit without getting anything for his country''.

Papandreou's good relations with Gaddafi and Arafat, as well as his controversy with Israel, worsened the anti-Americanism stance expressed by PASOK, always in the light of ''national independence - power'' and under the ''power to the people''. In other words, the line of ''independence'' was fundamental for PASOK and for its first government. At a time when in the developed northern European countries a debate on the reform of the rule of law, the expansion of the welfare state and the economic development had started, the Greek social democrats were focused on national liberation, in order to attract and eventually integrate the indignant Greek society.

The Elements of Traditional Social Democracy and Modernization as Parameters of PASOK's Transformation
After the period of social and national radicalization that pushed PASOK into power, a phase of adaptation to the real world came about. At this stage, PASOK initially was transformed into a party of traditional social democracy focusing on the vision of social normalization of inequalities and the democratic modernization of the country. In the 1990s, PASOK was transformed into a party of the new social democracy, as long as it followed several principles of Giddens's third way.

PASOK's first phase of governance from 1981 to 1985 can be described as a phase of traditional social democracy in Greece. PASOK undertook the difficult task of democratization and modernization while creating a modern welfare state (income redistribution, salary and pension increases, introduction of the National Health System, urban-modernization, democratization of the trade union's legislative framework and redevelopment of labor relations). As Stathopoulos⁴³ states ''the elections of 1981 brought the PASOK to power and for most of the period ---- 1980-95, Greece has been ruled by socialist party governments. It is during these years that the social services were expanded and reformed and state expenditure on social welfare rose substantially. ...... Public expenditure grew from 17.4% of GDP ... in 1980 (to) a high 53.3% in 1990. The corresponding figures for social expenditure were ... 11.1% and 20.9%, respectively''. Further, on the same lines, Moschonas⁴⁴ states ''PASOK, with a Keynesian program for expanding overall demand, attempted to revitalize economic growth and to implement what it called ''the third way to socialism''. A central element in PASOK's economic and social strategy was a policy of redistribution. There was a steep overall rise in social expenditures from a modest 10.2% of GDP in 1980 to 16% in 1985 (the end of PASOK's first term in office), stabilizing at 15.5% in 1989 (the end of the party's second term). The establishment of the National Health System in 1983 was central to the construction of a genuine welfare state-and another symbolic move strengthening the party's left-wing image''.

These policies were implemented along with some budgetary constraints (stabilization program of the economy 1985-1987) due to the criteria for joining EMU until 1989. In the third phase of its development since 1989, PASOK joined the mandate of economic modernization on the basis of which the development of the economy and Greek capitalism were defined as the main priorities rather than the satisfaction of the needs of the workers. At this stage of modernization, the PASOK government tried to reduce inflation, public debt, liberalize markets and partially reduce redistribution policies. As a result, from 2000 onwards, the country would present a primary surplus and, above all, enter a period of high growth.⁴⁵

However, the needs of society, at this stage, were not completely neglected, but they were subordinated to some rules of rational management, competitiveness and Europeanization. In fact, this was implemented through a clear technocratic shift in PASOK's overall policy, as well as through the final and irrevocable abandonment of the socialist transformation of society as the ultimate goal. In other words, PASOK reached its own ''Bad Godesberg'' 40 years after the German Social Democrats decided to definitively abandon the attempt to overthrow capitalism.

Conclusion
The fact is that the emergence of PASOK is linked with social, political and economic achievements that contributed to the adjustment of Greece to modern international and European standards after a long phase of obscurantism and authoritarianism. Even if someone criticizes the PASOK governments for mistakes and deflections, no one should deny their positive aspects and policies. Some of the positive aspects are the establishment of the National Health System, the introduction of labor and family law, the process of democratization of public institutions and of the army, the introduction of the transparent procedures for hiring in the public sector (ASEP) and of Citizens' Service Centers (KEP), the establishment of welfare institutions, the creation of modern infrastructure-but with disproportionate costs, the digitalization of the public services, a fair redistribution of income and opportunities, regional convergence, decentralization and investment in education and innovation.⁴⁶ All the above-mentioned should not be underestimated.

PASOK's current character demonstrates that it has a flexible strategy and tactics that takes into account the changes that take place in the national, supranational and international socioeconomic and political framework. Historically, PASOK proved that it has acute reflections on the imperatives of the times. It understood the necessity to overcome the ''center'' after 1974, because it realized the extensive radicalization of the popular strata due to the junta and its consequences, while at the same time, utilized the strategic weaknesses of the Greek and international communist movement. PASOK can cope with the strategy of partial and gradual rather than total rupture as well as with the logic of democratic processes in its duty to express social democracy and reformism in Greece. So, if PASOK was originally a radical socialist party that was transformed into a social democratic one, it is neither surprising nor paradoxical, but corresponds to its real destination, which was nothing but to fill the social democratic vacuum in Greece.

The political history of PASOK's evolution has also shown that it had a certain function-role in the Greek political system after dictatorship. PASOK's initial ''radicalism'' and ''socialism'' were a form of democratic integration of the masses in the country's subsequent European course. In other words, radicalism was a logical strategy and tactic, while PASOK's real political choices, in every distinct phase of its development, are consistent with a certain strategy: they respond to the needs of democratization, humanism, renewal, formation and stabilization of the political and social system. In this sense, the ability to readjust and return to the political focus of PASOK has emerged even after the adoption of the toughest fiscal policy ever implemented in Europe and in the world amid the memoranda made for Greece.

The unsubstantiated term ''Pasokification'', which characterized the collapse of PASOK and its replacement by the radical SYRIZA⁴⁷, also could have a positive reversal. SYRIZA came to power with a radical platform against austerity, while PASOK shrank from the 160 seats in 2009 to 13 in 2015, being the smallest party in Parliament. However, SYRIZA succeeded in renewing its mandate from the electorate, but adhering to the conditions in the logic of drastic cuts, financial stability, stable and responsible management of the economy, which would reduce the country's debt, implemented a vast austerity program. In its effort to become a reputable government party, SYRIZA was exposed to the same plight as all previous governmental parties, losing both the moral and the verbal advantage. This process naturally leads to massive electoral losses. On the other hand, PASOK, with its new name ''Movement of Change'', is beginning to regain its credibility as long as it demonstrated an unprecedented persistence in a responsible pragmatism that the management of the crisis requires and it seems to try to express a clear social democratic narrative.

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Reference # 55J-2018-07-02-01